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Abstract 
It has historically been assumed that comparative (“more than”, “fewer/less than”) and superlative 
(“at most”, “at least”) quantifiers can be semantically analysed in accordance with their core logical-
mathematical properties.  However, recent theoretical and experimental work has cast doubt on the 
validity of this assumption.  Geurts and Nouwen (2007) have claimed that superlative quantifiers 
possess an additional modal component in their semantics which is absent from comparative 
quantifiers, and that this accounts for the previously neglected differences in usage and interpretation 
between the two types of quantifier which they identify.  Their semantically modal hypothesis has 
received additional support from empirical investigations.  In this paper, we further corroborate that 
superlative quantifiers have additional modal interpretations.  However, we propose an alternative 
analysis, whereby these quantifiers possess the semantics postulated by the classical model, and the 
additional aspects of meaning arise as a consequence of psychological complexity and pragmatic 
implicature.  We explain how this model is consistent with the existing empirical findings.  
Additionally, we present the findings of four novel experiments which support our model above the 
semantically modal account. 
1. Introduction 
There is an ever-burgeoning literature in semantics and pragmatics dealing with the interpretation of 
number terms.  At first sight, the natural numbers appear ideal candidates for formalisation using 
classical approaches borrowed from mathematical logic.  However, this approach turns out to be 
fraught with difficulties, which continue to be debated at great length. 
Until recently, it has been assumed that certain categories of numerically quantified expressions can 
be formalised in a fairly intuitive way.  This paper deals with two classes of such expressions, 
comparative and superlative quantifiers.  Comparative quantifiers are those of the form “more than” 
and “fewer/less than”, and have traditionally been regarded as equivalent to the mathematical symbols 
> and < respectively.  Superlative quantifiers are those of the form “at most” and “at least”, and have 
traditionally been regarded as equivalent to the symbols ≤ and ≥ respectively.  Restricting our 
attention to cardinalities, it follows from this approach that superlative and comparative quantifiers 
are interdefinable, as in the following examples. 
(1) John has at most two cars ↔ John has fewer than three cars 
(2) Kelly has at least three children ↔ Kelly has more than two children 
This view is challenged by Geurts and Nouwen (2007), who argue that equivalence does not typically 
hold between comparative and superlative quantifiers.  They observe four differences in the usage and 
interpretation of these types of quantifier.  First, they note that superlative quantifiers admit a specific 
construal, absent from the comparative quantifier.  Secondly, they identify differences in the patterns 
of inference that arise from the putatively equivalent sentences.  Thirdly, they observe distributional 
differences between comparative and superlative forms.  And finally, they claim that certain usages of 
comparative quantifiers give rise to ambiguity which does not follow from the superlative 
„equivalent‟.  To address these issues, they develop a proposal in which comparative and superlative 
quantifiers differ in modality. 
Geurts and Nouwen‟s proposal gives rise to several empirically testable predictions, notably that the 
superlative quantifiers will be mastered more slowly by acquirers, that they will be disfavoured in 
processing, and that they will give rise to different reasoning patterns.  These proposals are 
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investigated by Geurts et al. (2010), in a series of experiments.  Broadly the predictions are borne out, 
and thus Geurts and Nouwen‟s account is favoured by comparison with the classical approach. 
In this paper, we develop an alternative proposal to that offered by Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  
Rather than proposing a modal component to the semantics of superlative quantifiers, we propose that 
there is a fundamental difference in complexity between expressions conveying ≤ and ≥ and those 
conveying < and >, which we will argue arises from the disjunctive nature of non-strict comparison.  
We will argue, following Büring (2007), that the use of superlative quantifiers triggers an implicature.  
We show that the classical model of quantifier semantics, augmented with this distinction, gives 
similar predictions to those made by Geurts and Nouwen, and is consistent with the data they use to 
argue against the classical model.  We further demonstrate that the data obtained by Geurts et al. 
(2010) are compatible with our account.  We then conduct additional experiments which demonstrate 
the availability of inferences predicted to be unavailable by Geurts and Nouwen, and the acceptability 
of statements they predict to be unacceptable.  We show that these data are compatible with our 
augmented classical model.  Finally we argue that on the basis of these data, as well as considerations 
of parsimony and acquirability, the augmented classical model should be preferred to the semantically 
modal account. 
2. Problems with the classical view of comparative and superlative quantifiers 
As outlined above, the classical view of comparative and superlative quantifiers holds them to be 
interdefinable in a systematic way: “at most n” = “fewer than n+1”, “at least n” = “more than n-1”.  In 
addition to providing us with an elegant formal treatment of these entities, this account conforms with  
our naïve intuitions about the truth conditions of numerically quantified statements.  These intuitions 
require that “John has at most two children” is false only in cases where the cardinality of the set 
{John‟s children} is 3 or more, and “Kelly has at least three cars” is false only in cases where the 
cardinality of the set {Kelly‟s cars} is 2 or less. 
However, Geurts and Nouwen (2007) identify a number of areas in which this account is 
unsatisfactory.  They are suspicious of interdefinability on the grounds that it implies that one set of 
quantifiers is entirely redundant, given the existence of the other
1
.  They also specify a number of 
additional objections to the analysis, as described in the following paragraphs. 
A key objection is that the inference patterns arising from the superlative quantifiers differ from those 
admitted by the comparative forms.  Geurts and Nouwen argue that a sentence such as (3a) gives rise 
to the inference (3b) but not to the inference (3c), despite (3b) and (3c) being semantically identical 
on the classical view. 
(3a) Dave had (exactly) three Martinis 
(3b) Dave had more than two Martinis 
(3c) Dave had at least three Martinis 
                                                          
1
 Arguably the quantifiers are not, even on the classical view, interdefinable on non-discrete sets such as are 
used in measurements: “more than 2 metres” cannot be equivalent to “at least x metres” for any x.  This could 
license the existence of both types of quantifier, although by itself it does not explain why both are actually used 
in discrete cases.  In this paper we follow Geurts and Nouwen (2007) in focusing on these discrete cases, but 
note that our argument will have implications for the analysis of the more general continuous case. 
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They support their intuitions by verifying this claim experimentally.  Hence, it appears that the 
meanings of comparative and superlative quantifiers systematically differ in some profound way. 
In addition to these, Geurts and Nouwen collate data suggesting that the distribution of comparative 
and superlative quantifiers differs systematically.  They observe that the argument of superlative 
quantifiers can have a specific construal, which is not licensed by the theoretically equivalent 
comparative quantifiers.  This provides a referent for the “namely” clause in (4a), which is 
unacceptable in (4b). 
(4a) There are at most two people who have that authority, namely the Queen and the Prime 
Minister 
(4b) *There are fewer than three people who have that authority, namely the Queen and the Prime 
Minister 
Geurts and Nouwen (2007: 537f) also note that the superlative quantifiers have a wider range than 
their comparative counterparts, citing the following examples. 
(5a) Betty had three Martinis at most / *fewer than 
(5b) At least / *More than  Betty had three Martinis 
They note that some contexts permit the comparative but not the superlative quantifier, though the 
prohibition is less clear-cut, as in (6). 
(6) Betty didn‟t have ?at least / more than three Martinis 
Finally, they claim that sentences with comparative quantifiers are sometimes ambiguous in a way 
that those with superlative quantifiers are not.  In particular, they contrast (7a) and (7b). 
(7a) You may have at most two beers 
(7b) You may have fewer than three beers 
Geurts and Nouwen argue that the latter (comparative) does not necessarily rule out the possibility 
that the addressee may have more than three beers, it merely grants permission to have a smaller 
number of beers.  Although they admit that “this construal may seem far-fetched” (2007: 539), they 
contend that this does represent a difference in meaning between these two sentences that is not 
captured by the classical account. 
In summary, there are reasons arising from both the interpretation and distribution of these quantifiers 
to support the contention that the classical view of their meaning is inadequate.  In the following 
section, we discuss the specific proposal outlined by Geurts and Nouwen (2007) for dealing with 
these puzzles. 
3. The semantically modal account of superlative quantifier meaning 
Geurts and Nouwen (2007) propose an account of quantifier meaning in which superlative quantifiers 
have a modal component of meaning.  Specifically, they consider the example (8). 
(8) Betty drank at least four highballs 
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They ascribe to (8) a semantic formula that can be glossed as “the speaker is certain that there is a 
group of four highballs each of which was drunk by Betty, and considers it possible that Betty drank 
more than four highballs” (p.552). 
For the corresponding “at most” sentence, “Betty drank at most four highballs”, they obtain the 
analysis that “it grants the possibility that Betty had four highballs, and it excludes the possibility that 
she had more than four” (ibid.) 
They also propose that comparative and superlative quantifiers differ in argument type.  Their 
conjecture is that superlative quantifiers accept arguments of any Boolean type, i.e. both propositional 
and predicative arguments.  In this way, they analyse “At least it isn‟t raining” as an assertion “that 
the speaker is sure it isn‟t raining, and that he considers it possible that something „better‟ than non-
raining might be the case, as well” (ibid.). 
Using their account, Geurts and Nouwen are able to give solutions to all the problems they previously 
discussed.   From the assumption that comparative and superlative quantifiers are not interdefinable, it 
follows that there is no redundancy in the system.  The more substantive issues raised in the preceding 
section may be resolved as follows. 
 The inference patterns involving superlative quantifiers are a subset of those arising from 
comparative quantifiers, because of clashes of modality.  “At most n” does not imply “at most 
n+1”, “exactly n” does not imply “at most n” or “at least n”, and so on. 
 The specific construal of the argument of the superlative quantifier is possible because its 
argument (e.g. “two people”) may be parsed as an existential quantifier.  This is not legitimate 
in the comparative case because the comparative quantifier does not accept non-predicative 
arguments. 
 The validity of superlative quantifiers in a broader range of contexts than comparative 
quantifiers stems from their ability to accept additional argument types.  At the same time, the 
inappropriateness of superlative quantifiers in other contexts – for example, under the scope 
of negation – reflects their modal semantic content.   
 The ambiguity in the fourth case does not arise in the modal case due to factors involving the 
semantic combination of modal expressions – Geurts and Nouwen refer to this as modal 
concord.  Put simply, their view appears to be that the superlative quantifier enters 
unambiguously into a concord reading with the preceding modal, as these both express 
possibility.  
In sum, Geurts and Nouwen‟s modal theory of superlative quantifier meaning accounts well for the 
observed findings, modulo some concerns about the treatment of superlative quantifiers in conditional 
environments (to which we return later).  In addition, their theory gives rise to empirically testable 
predictions.  In the following section, we review the work done on investigating these predictions. 
4. Empirical investigation of quantifier meaning 
Geurts and Nouwen (2007) subject some of their intuitions about the inference patterns arising from 
these quantifiers to empirical investigation.  However, their theory gives rise to a broader range of 
predictions that are also susceptible to testing by experimental means.  Geurts et al. (2010) argue that 
three particular predictions arise from the modal view of superlative quantifier usage.  These are (i) 
that superlative quantifiers give rise to different inference patterns to comparative quantifiers; (ii) that 
superlative quantifiers should be harder to learn than comparatives, on the basis of their additional 
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semantic complexity; and (iii) that superlative quantifiers should be harder to process than 
comparatives, for the same reason.   
In this section we summarise the work done by Geurts et al. to investigate these predictions, as well as 
the findings of other research bearing upon these questions
2
.   
4.1 Inference patterns arising from comparative and superlative quantifiers 
Supporting their intuitions, Geurts and Nouwen (2007) performed a pencil-and-paper experiment in 
which they asked participants to decide whether certain implications were valid.  Broadly, their 
participants concurred that (in Dutch) “Beryl had three sherries” implied both “Beryl had more than 
two sherries” and “Beryl had fewer than five sherries”.  By contrast, 78% of their participants rejected 
the implication “Beryl had at most four sherries”, and only about half accepted “Beryl had at least 
three sherries”. 
This technique was employed for a wider range of premise/conclusion pairs by Geurts et al. (2010), 
again in Dutch.  Instead of using “fewer than five” and “at most four” as Geurts and Nouwen did, 
Geurts et al. used “fewer than four” (accepted 93% of the time) and “at most three” (accepted 61% of 
the time)
3.  They also added three further pairs of conditions.  These were “at most two” → “at most 
three” (14% acceptance) versus “fewer than three” → “fewer than four” (71% acceptance); “at least 
three” → “three” (50% acceptance) versus “at most three” → “three” (18% acceptance); and “3 or 4” 
→ “at least three” (96%) versus “2 or 3” → “at most three” (93%).  As these latter two comparisons 
do not contrast superlative with comparative quantifiers, but instead explore the effect of entailment 
direction, we shall not discuss them further here. 
In summary, these data constitute additional evidence for the non-equivalence of comparative and 
superlative quantifiers in a reasoning context.  Valid arguments involving comparative quantifiers 
seem to fail, in the opinion of the majority, when recast using superlative quantifiers that are 
„classically‟ equivalent.  Most strikingly, the inference from “at most two” → “at most three” 
succeeds in only 14% of cases, where the putatively equivalent “fewer than three” → “fewer than 
four” achieves 71% acceptance.  This concurs with the prediction arising from Geurts and Nouwen‟s 
account, and thus offers it empirical support. 
As Geurts and Nouwen (2007) discuss, there are issues concerning the interpretation of the bare 
numerals in these items, which might mean “exactly n” or “at least n”.  This distinction is critical to 
the validity of several of the inferences under test; for instance, “at least three” → “three” is false 
under the first reading of “three” but is tautologous under the second.  Geurts et al. (2010) address this 
in a follow-up task using “exactly three”, obtaining similar results; however, it could be argued that 
this modification draws the participants‟ attention to the underinformativeness of the non-exact 
statement and could bias them towards its rejection.  Nevertheless, the distinction between 
comparative and superlative quantifiers is compellingly supported by this experiment. 
4.2 Delay in acquisition of superlative quantifiers 
Prior to Geurts and Nouwen‟s (2007) prediction, the acquisition of comparative and superlative 
quantifiers had already been compared by Musolino (2004: 26-8).  In his experiment, participants are 
given a selection of cards with zero to four objects on them, and asked to select those with “exactly 
                                                          
2
 These experiments were conducted using native-speaker participants, and in English unless otherwise stated. 
3
 This controls for informativeness and makes it more legitimate to compare upward- and downward-entailing 
quantifiers. 
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2”, “at least/most 2”, or “more than 2”.  Adults performed at or near ceiling in all conditions.  
However, while children (aged 4-5) were 100% accurate on “exactly 2” and 88% accurate on “more 
than”, they performed at chance on the superlative quantifiers.  By asking the child participants about 
their understanding of these terms, Musolino demonstrated that their poor performance on the 
superlative quantifiers was rooted in a profound lack of understanding of these quantifiers‟ meanings. 
Geurts et al. (2010) further develop this line of enquiry, using a different experimental protocol.  Their 
experiment involved presenting participants with a set of 6 boxes, some of which each contained a toy 
of a certain kind.  They asked the participants to make the situation match the sentence they were 
about to hear, either by adding toys, removing toys, or leaving the boxes as they were.  The test 
sentences were of the form “Q of the boxes have a toy”, where Q was a numerical quantifier; the 
subjects were adults and children aged 11 years.   
Adults performed at 100% in all conditions, while the children‟s performance ranged from 97% on 
“more than three” to 42% on “at most three”.  “More than” and “at least” were easier than “fewer 
than” and “at most” respectively, and comparative quantifiers were privileged over superlative 
quantifiers. 
Assuming that these snapshots of development are a reasonable depiction of stages in the process of 
acquiring comparative and superlative quantifiers, then this experimental evidence also supports 
Geurts and Nouwen‟s hypothesis.  It appears that children first master “more than”, and much later 
develop an understanding of the corresponding superlative quantifier “at least”.  Similarly, “fewer 
than” is followed at a distance by “at most”, which has typically still not been mastered at the age of 
11.  Therefore we can conclude that comparative quantifiers are indeed mastered earlier than 
superlative quantifiers, as Geurts and Nouwen‟s theory predicts. 
In passing, we note that these experimental data are also coherent with input frequencies, if we take 
general corpora to be indicative of these.  It is clear that comparative quantifiers are used substantially 
more frequently than superlative quantifiers: for instance, the British National Corpus (BNC) gives 
the frequency of their occurrence with the numerals 1-20 (in digital form) as follows. 
 More than: 1243 
 Less than: 698 
 Fewer than: 86 
 At least: 812 
 At most: 44 
However, this is clearly not the whole story, as we have to account for these frequency trends 
themselves.  From a modal perspective, these could be argued to arise from the difference in core 
meaning.  Later in this paper, we will be arguing that the infrequency of superlative quantifiers stems 
from their complexity.  In either case, we do not commit to a view as to whether the order of 
acquisition is causally modulated by frequency, although this is not implausible. 
4.3 Delay in processing of superlative quantifiers 
                                                          
4
 A reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper pointed out that “at most” is much closer to the others in frequency 
in a Google search, with around 30m hits as against 450m for “at least”.  In the BNC, “at most” occurs 478 
times in all, and “at least” 25,090 times.  However, many of the Google instances of “at most” are locative + 
quantifier, e.g. 114,000 “at most places”, 90,800 “at most stores”, and numerous instances of “at most of”. The 
same holds for the BNC, which is why we restrict the statistics reported to the cases of collocations with 
numerals. 
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Geurts et al. (in press) also test the online processing of comparative and superlative quantifiers by 
adult participants, as we discussed earlier.  Recall that participants were presented with a sentence 
“There are Q As” or “There are Q Bs”, and then a display in which some number of the letters A or B 
are present.  They were asked to press a button to indicate whether the sentence is true or false of the 
situation displayed.  Reading times and decision times were measured.  Within the decision times, 
there were effects of both entailment direction and quantifier type, just as for the acquisition 
experiment: “at most” was the slowest to be verified, “more than” the quickest.  For the reading times, 
there were no significant effects.  This was argued to support the hypothesis of complexity; the task 
involving deeper processing gave rise to evident delays in the superlative case, as predicted from 
Geurts and Nouwen‟s account. 
It is also worth remarking upon the correlation between complexity/processing difficulty and age-of-
acquisition for these quantifiers, as demonstrated by the previous experiment.  The data from this 
experiment support a view in which the quantifiers which are acquired later are more difficult to 
process.  Also, although the reading times are statistically not significantly different, they can be seen 
to pattern with the decision times, though they vary to a much less pronounced effect. 
4.4. Interim summary 
We have seen how Geurts et al.‟s (2010) experiments bear out the predictions made by Geurts and 
Nouwen (2007), and thus constitute evidence in favour of the semantically modal account over the 
classical model.  In the following section, we spell out an alternative proposal which captures the 
aspects of the interpretation of superlative quantifiers that Geurts and Nouwen highlighted, but with a 
different division of labour between semantics and pragmatics than they envisioned. We further 
examine how this can account for the empirical data discussed above. 
5. A pragmatic account of superlative quantifier meaning 
In discussing the classical model (attributed to Barwise and Cooper 1981), both Geurts and Nouwen 
(2007) and Geurts et al. (2010) have drawn no distinction between the comparative and superlative 
forms.  From a formal point of view, this is correct; the classical view predicts that “at most n” is true 
in exactly the same set of cases for which “fewer than n+1” is true.  In this approach, comparative and 
superlative quantifiers are also equal in mathematical complexity; each corresponds to one symbol, be 
it >, <,  ≤ or ≥.  This amounts to the observation that each quantifier maps a pair of arguments to a 
truth value. 
However, here we wish to consider the possibility that the operators > and < are not equivalent to the 
operators ≤ and ≥ because the latter pair can each be regarded as disjunctions, at some non-linguistic 
level of representation.  We suggest that ≤ and ≥ are represented as “= n or < n” and “= n or > n” 
respectively.  Furthermore, as per the classical model, we wish to propose that the operators ≤ and ≥ 
provide the semantics of natural language “at most” and “at least”, just as the operators < and > 
provide the semantics of the comparative quantifiers.  On this proposal, not only ≤ and ≥  but also 
natural language “at least” and “at most” are treated as disjunctions.  The latter part of this claim is 
consistent with Büring‟s (2007) analysis whereby “at least n” is interpreted as “exactly n or more than 
n”, and “at most n” is interpreted as “exactly n or fewer than n”.  (This in turn extends the semantic 
account proposed by Krifka (1999)). 
This proposal has three important implications.  First, in accordance with Büring‟s analysis, the use of 
a superlative quantifier, whose meaning is a disjunction, gives rise to a quantity implicature, as a 
consequence of Grice‟s (1975) first maxim of quantity.  “At least n” conveys semantically that ≥ n 
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holds, and implicates that the speaker does not know (or is not at liberty to say) whether it is the case 
that = n or > n holds.  Similarly, “at most n” conveys semantically that ≤ n holds, and implicates that 
the speaker does not know (or is not at liberty to say) whether it is the case that = n or < n holds.  This 
is the classical clausal implicature associated with disjunction (e.g. Horn 1972), whereby by asserting 
that “p or q” the speaker implicates that (s)he is not in a position to make a stronger statement, such as 
asserting that “p” or that “q”5.  This proposal is distinct from that of Geurts and Nouwen (2007) as no 
specific notion of modality is stipulated as part of the semantics of superlative quantifiers.  Indeed, no 
semantic difference is proposed between comparative and superlative quantifiers (other than the 
numerical difference in their arguments); the difference in modality is now captured as a pragmatic 
inference.    
A second consequence of this proposal is that both the natural language expressions “at least n” and 
“at most n” and the logical operators ≤ and ≥ may be more difficult to process at a psychological level 
than the natural language expressions “more than n” and “fewer than n” and the logical operators < 
and > respectively.  This is because, at a psychological level, the disjunction “= n or > n” could be 
more complex than either of the disjuncts “= n” or “> n” on their own.  We would expect the 
difference in psychological complexity to manifest itself in a usage preference for the less complex 
option, when both are available. 
A third consequence of this proposal is that any differences in usage and meaning between superlative 
and comparative quantifiers are not attached to the specific forms “at most” and “at least”, but rather 
that they arise because of the pragmatic implicatures and psychological complexity associated with 
expressions whose underlying meaning is a disjunction.  Thus our account predicts that all forms 
which are semantically expressible as ≤ and ≥ will pattern together, and behave distinctively from the 
forms expressible as < or >.  This is coherent with the account offered by Nouwen (2010): his class A 
modifiers are those traditionally expressible as < or >, and his class B modifiers those expressible as ≤ 
and ≥.  However, unlike Nouwen, we do not posit a more elaborate semantic difference between these 
classes of modifier.  We will follow Nouwen (2008) in referring to < and > as strict comparison and ≤ 
and ≥ as non-strict comparison. 
Thus, we propose that by treating “at most” and “at least” as disjunctions, we can identify two 
grounds on which superlative and comparative quantifiers differ, namely the clausal implicature and 
the psychological complexity associated with the former.  In Section 6, we shall see how these 
differences can be invoked to explain extant experiment findings on the difference between 
comparative and superlative quantifiers. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will first present an experimental justification of the analysis of 
superlative quantifiers as psychologically complex, and specifically disjunctive.  We will discuss the 
explanation of extant experimental findings in terms of this proposal.  We will then exhibit evidence 
in support of the classical view of quantifiers, augmented by this disjunctive analysis (and consequent 
implicatures), against the semantically modal account of Geurts and Nouwen (2007). 
                                                          
5
 As observed by Büring (2007), this proposal assumes that the implicature is triggered by a property of the 
expression – namely that it is disjunctive – rather than the expression itself.  This is a departure from standard 
Gricean analyses, in which implicatures are derivable from what is said. If correct, this proposal requires a 
thorough re-consideration of the notion of implicature. However, note that the implicature we wish to derive 
could also be based on the manner maxim: a speaker must have a reason to use a complex expression (e.g. „at 
most n‟, according to Büring‟s analysis in which this is disjunctive) when a simpler one is available (e.g. „fewer 
than n+1‟, which is analysed as a simplex proposition).  In this case, a good reason to use „at most n‟ is to 
highlight that „exactly n‟ is a likely possibility. With this in mind, we leave the question of the precise nature of 
the implicature involved to future study. 
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6. Experiment 1 – Empirical investigation of the complexity of non-strict comparison 
To the best of our knowledge, the distinction between strict and non-strict comparison has not been 
studied in detail within the domain of the psychology of mathematics.  However, we posit that non-
strict comparison is more complex, and specifically disjunctive, on the following grounds. 
(a)  Assuming that the basic means of comparison between two quantities are “more/less than” 
and “equal to”,  > and < each correspond to a single simplex operation of comparison.  ≤ and 
≥ are each obtained by the disjunction of two simplex operations, and are thus greater in 
complexity. 
(b) The operators > and < are customarily glossed as “greater than” and “less than”, while ≤ and 
≥ are customarily glossed as “less than or equal to” and “greater than or equal to”.  The 
absence of a non-disjunctive expression for these operators in common parlance suggests that 
they are naturally regarded as complex. 
The above observations suggest that the claim that superlative quantifiers are disjunctive might be 
plausible, but fall far short of making a convincing case for it.  However, it is also possible to 
investigate this claim by adapting a technique applied to comparative and superlative quantifiers by 
Geurts et al. (2010).   
In their experiment, Geurts et al. (2010) presented participants with a sentence on a computer screen 
of the form “There are Q N Xs”, where Q denotes a quantifier of the form “exactly”, “at least”, “at 
most”, “more than” or “fewer than”, N denotes a number, and X denotes a letter (either A or B).  The 
participants were instructed to press a key once they had read and understood the sentence.  They 
were then shown a display consisting of some number of instances of the relevant letter, either A or B, 
and instructed to indicate whether the preceding sentence had been true or false of this situation, by 
pressing the appropriate key.  Over a series of 38 trials, the response times for each participant in each 
condition were measured and analysed. 
Geurts et al. (2010) demonstrated a processing preference for comparative over superlative 
quantifiers, by demonstrating that the former gave rise to a shorter response time.  If non-strict 
comparison is processed as a disjunction, we expect that comparisons involving strict comparison will 
give rise to longer response times than strict comparisons, even in the absence of any linguistically 
relevant content (such as comparative or superlative quantifiers).  By contrast, if both strict and non-
strict comparison are equally demanding, there should be no significant effect of comparison type. 
6.1 Methodology 
In our experiment, we replicated the methodology of Geurts et al. (2010), as described above, with the 
following change.  In place of sentences of the form “There are Q N Xs”, our participants read 
statements of the form “X ? N”, where X denotes a letter (either A or B), N denotes a number, and ? 
denotes a symbol (either =, >, <, ≤ or ≥).  Each of the 38 items used by Geurts et al. was translated 
into this form (6 for equality, 8 for each of the other conditions).  The display of letters proceeded as 
in Geurts et al.‟s experiment, and participants were given the same instructions (substituting the word 
“statement” for “sentence”). 
The experiment was administered to 20 subjects, all members of the University of Cambridge, aged 
between 20 and 36.  16 of the subjects were female.  The results of two participants were excluded 
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from the following analysis, one for a high error rate (18/38 = 47%, compared to 30/684 = 4.4% for 
the 18 participants analysed) and one for a slow mean response time (more than twice the mean for 
the 18 participants analysed).  In addition, following Geurts et al. (2010) we excluded incorrect 
responses from consideration.   Also, in order to minimise the effect of outliers arising through lapses 
in concentration, we further trimmed the data by removing from consideration any responses that 
exceeded (Mean + 2 S.D.) for the individual participant
6
.  
6.2 Results 
The participants‟ performance across the test conditions was as follows.  
Condition Number of observations Mean response time in ms (SD) 
= 105 982 (314) 
> 132 1007 (369) 
< 123 1061 (354) 
≥ 139 1110 (466) 
≤ 130 1131 (384) 
 
To compare all four test conditions at once, a linear regression was performed in R (R Development 
Core Team, 2008), using two predictor variables – “direction of entailment”, which was set to +0.5 
for > and ≥ and -0.5 for < and ≤, and “comparison type”, which was set to +0.5 for ≥ and ≤ and -0.5 
for > and <.  This analysis failed to reach significance for direction of entailment (t = -1.08, p = 0.14) 
but a significant effect was obtained for comparison type (t = 2.48; p = 0.013).  That is, the conditions 
of non-strict comparison gave rise to significantly longer response times than their strict comparison 
counterparts. 
Further pairwise comparisons were performed between the upward- and downward-entailing 
conditions, and between those of strict and non-strict comparison.  ≥ differed significantly from > 
(Student‟s t-test, t = 2.01, df = 269, p < 0.05 two-tailed), while ≤ versus < narrowly failed to reach 
significance (t = 1.51, df = 251, p = 0.066 one-tailed). 
6.3 Discussion 
The findings of this experiment closely parallel those of Geurts et al. (2010).  Specifically, the 
condition of equality is numerically the fastest to be verified.  Of the remaining four conditions, the ≤ 
condition is the slowest and the > condition is the fastest to be verified.  There is a statistically 
significant main effect of non-strict comparison, supporting the hypothesis that non-strict comparison 
is more complex than strict comparison.   
In this experiment, the effect of entailment direction was marginally non-significant, but the pattern 
resembled that of Geurts et al., with < faster than > and ≤ faster than <.  However, neither our 
                                                          
6
 Note that this is a conservative manipulation in that, under the hypothesis that there are no differences between 
conditions, it should apply across conditions equally; while under the hypothesis that the conditions differ, it 
tends to suppress those differences. 
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proposal nor the semantically modal account of Geurts and Nouwen (2007) makes clear predictions 
about the effect of entailment direction, so we propose to leave this matter aside in the remainder of 
this paper. 
In sum, the pattern across the five conditions is highly similar to that obtained in Geurts et al.‟s (2010) 
third experiment, suggesting that that the substitution of sentences involving comparative and 
superlative quantifiers with statements involving mathematical operators has not materially influenced 
the outcome.  
One possible explanation of this is that participants are converting experimental items between these 
two formats – the mathematical expression and the numerical quantifier – in order to perform the task.  
If this is occurring, the time taken in one format should be a function of that taken in the other.  This 
interpretation is, however, problematic for Geurts et al.‟s explanation of their findings within the 
modal proposal of Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  We reason as follows.  If the sentences with numerical 
quantifiers are being converted into mathematical expressions, it appears that the modality present in 
the superlative quantifiers is being jettisoned during this process (unless we make the ambitious and 
novel claim that the mathematical operators ≤ and ≥ also possess modal semantic content).  Hence it 
is no longer clear why superlative quantifiers should give rise to longer decision times than 
comparative quantifiers, especially if we make the reasonable supposition that this conversion occurs 
during the reading phase rather than the decision phase.  Conversely, if the statements containing the 
operators ≤ and ≥ are being converted into sentences of the form “at most” and “at least”, they appear 
to be acquiring modal content – on Geurts et al.‟s account – which they previously lacked.  That is, 
the conversion is not a semantically appropriate one.   
The observation that response times in our study are faster than those in Geurts et al.‟s study suggests 
that the conversion is more likely to be proceeding from linguistic to mathematical expressions than 
vice versa.  If this is the case, then the modal-semantic explanation for the processing delay is not 
viable, unless the translation from modal sentence to non-modal statement is happening during the 
decision phase.  However, we should note that variation between participants‟ response times is 
considerable, and it is possible that the faster response times merely reflect higher performance by this 
set of subjects, by comparison with those who performed Geurts et al.‟s version of the task. 
For the moment, therefore, we do not wish to commit to a view on whether the above descriptions 
correctly characterise the participants‟ process in performing this task.  It suffices for our purpose to 
draw the conclusion – licensed by the same arguments put forward by Geurts et al. (2010) – that non-
strict comparison is more complex than strict comparison.  This supports the hypothesis that non-strict 
comparison is treated as disjunctive.  In what follows, we explore the consequences of adding this into 
the classical model of numerical quantifier semantics. 
7. Consequences of the complexity of non-strict comparison 
Having presented empirical evidence for the claim that non-strict comparison is psychologically more 
complex than strict comparison, and argued that this is consistent with the idea that non-strict 
comparative forms such as superlative quantifiers are treated as disjunctions, we now consider the 
consequences of this for the system of numerical quantifiers in general. 
One such consequence might be that the reasoning patterns arising from superlative quantifiers are not 
identical to those arising from comparative quantifiers, in that the superlative quantifiers obstruct the 
generation of logically valid inferences.  This follows because the disjunction gives rise to an 
implicature, as set out in Büring (2007).  Recall that, for instance, “at most” can be analysed as “less 
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than or equal to”, and hence the use of “at most” in declarative contexts gives rise to the implicatures 
that “less than” and “equal to” are both possibilities.  The latter implicature disrupts the inferential 
process explored in Experiment 1 of Geurts et al. (2010), as described below.   
Consider the case discussed in Section 4.1, where participants are asked whether the implication 
“Beryl had at most three sherries” → “Beryl had at most four sherries” is legitimate.  According to the 
classical account, this should be acceptable, but it is rejected by the vast majority of participants.  By 
contrast, in our disjunctive account of “at most”, the consequent “Beryl had at most four sherries” 
gives rise to the implicature that it is possible, from the speaker‟s point of view, that Beryl had exactly 
four sherries.  This directly contradicts the antecedent, “Beryl had at most three sherries”.  This has 
the potential to block participants‟ acceptance of the implication under test. 
Note that this explanation is similar in character to that proposed by Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  In 
their account, the implication “at most n” → “at most n-1” fails because of a contradiction at the level 
of semantics, in that “at most n” is held to encompass the explicit possibility of “exactly n”.  Our 
account differs only in that this explicit possibility arises through pragmatics rather than semantics; 
specifically, through the implicature derived from the use of the complex, disjunctive non-strict 
comparison. 
So far we have seen how the classical account, augmented with a more sophisticated analysis of non-
strict comparison, can answer some of the criticisms developed by Geurts and Nouwen (2007), and 
coheres with their observations about the inference pattern, as supported empirically by Geurts et al. 
(2010).  However, we also need to demonstrate that this account is equally compatible with the other 
experimental data discussed earlier. 
Geurts et al.‟s (2010) second experiment bore out the prediction that the comparative quantifiers are 
mastered earlier in acquisition than their superlative counterparts.  Here, once again, our enhanced 
version of the classical account makes the same prediction as the semantically modal account of 
Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  As we argue that superlative quantifiers possess a more complex 
meaning than comparatives, in that they are represented disjunctively, we also predict that superlative 
quantifiers are disfavoured in acquisition.  Hence this experiment does not distinguish between the 
two competing proposals. 
The third experiment conducted by Geurts et al. (2010) shows faster verification times for 
comparative over superlative quantifiers, as discussed in Section 6 of this paper.  We demonstrated in 
that section that the same applies for strict versus non-strict comparison, in the absence of the specific 
linguistic constructs under investigation (comparative and superlative quantifiers).  Given this finding, 
we would predict that the same pattern should be replicated whenever strict and non-strict 
comparisons are in competition.  Therefore, our proposal is compatible with the finding that 
comparative quantifiers are verified faster than superlative quantifiers.  Moreover, we might argue 
that this proposal is more parsimonious than the semantically modal account of Geurts and Nouwen 
(2007), in that it explains the outcomes both of Geurts et al.‟s (2010) third experiment, for the 
quantifier case, and our first experiment (Section 6), for the comparison case.  We have already 
concluded that the superior performance on strict rather than non-strict comparison cannot readily be 
attributed for a semantic difference between comparative and superlative quantifiers, as participants 
do not appear to be invoking these quantifiers in their verification process. 
Hence, with reference to the major lines of argument made by Geurts and Nouwen (2007), and the 
experimental evidence adduced in support of this proposal by Geurts et al. (2010), we have seen that 
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our augmented version of the classical account is equally well supported as the semantically modal 
account.  In the following sections, we present data from a further set of experiments, first replicating 
Geurts et al.‟s findings on the inference judgement task, and then obtaining support for our augmented 
classical account over and above Geurts and Nouwen‟s proposal. 
8. Experiment 2 – Judgements of logical inference patterns 
In our next experiment, we set out to replicate the findings of Geurts et al. (2010) with respect to the 
inference judgement task.  We performed this experiment in order to verify that the patterns observed 
for Dutch quantifiers were also to be found in English.  We also administered a post-test questionnaire 
to ascertain whether participants had explicit knowledge of any differences between the two types of 
quantifier. 
8.1 Method 
15 adult participants were recruited, all of whom were students at the University of Cambridge.  None 
had any university-level background in mathematics or logic.  They were informed that they would 
see a series of pages, each with two sentences written on them, and that they should circle the answer 
“yes” if the first sentence implied the second, and “no” if it did not.  Three sentence pairs were used 
for each of 12 conditions (36 sentence pairs in all); these included the first eight conditions tested by 
Geurts et al. (2010) and four additional „false‟ conditions as controls.  The order of these sentence 
pairs was randomised, and the same order used for each participant.   
As a post-test, participants were asked to write a brief explanation of why they had answered the way 
they did, for the first instance of each of the 12 conditions. 
8.2 Results 
The following table presents the acceptance rates for the implication judgement task, and compares 
these rates with those obtained by Geurts et al. (for the eight conditions common to both studies). 
1
st
 quantifier 2
nd 
quantifier Acceptance 
(%) 
Geurts et al.  
acceptance (%) 
3 At least 3 62 50 
3 More than 2 100 100 
3 At most 3 42 61 
3 Fewer than 4 84 93 
At most 2 At most 3 2 14 
Fewer than 3  Fewer than 4 64 71 
At least 3 3 90 50 
At most 3 3 26 18 
More than 3 Fewer than 3 9 N/A 
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1
st
 quantifier 2
nd 
quantifier Acceptance 
(%) 
Geurts et al.  
acceptance (%) 
Fewer than 3 More than 3 0 N/A 
3 Fewer than 3 13 N/A 
3  More than 3 0 N/A 
 
The metalinguistic judgements elicited from the questionnaire were generally uninformative.  These 
exhibited a degree of uncertainty about some of the conditions, but provided no clear indications of 
any explicit awareness of modality or other semantic effects.  We shall not discuss these further in 
what follows. 
8.3 Discussion 
The results for the conditions common to both this experiment and Geurts et al. (2010) were generally 
very similar, with the exceptions of the “3” → “at most 3” and, most strikingly, the “at least 3” → “3” 
pairs.  We tentatively attribute this to item effects, arising from the potential ambiguity of the bare 
numeral
7
.  Rejection rates for the semantically incorrect control conditions were generally at or near 
ceiling. 
Crucially for our purposes, this experiment constitutes a replication of Geurts et al.‟s (2010) study as 
far as the comparative and superlative quantifiers are concerned.  We can see that, in English as in 
Dutch, performance on comparative quantifiers exceeds that on superlatives – judged by traditional 
standards of logical correctness – in all the cases for which we have comparable data.  Thus we 
conclude that, as expected, this is not an effect specific to Dutch. 
9. Experiment 3 – Compatibility judgements of numerically quantified expressions 
Following Geurts et al.‟s analysis, the rationale for the failure of “at most two” → “at most three” in 
Experiment 2 was as follows.  On the modal view, “at most three” admits the possibility of “(exactly) 
three”.  “At most two” uncontroversially excludes this possibility.  Therefore, as the possibility of 
“(exactly) three” cannot follow from “at most two”, the implication fails. 
Following this line of analysis, it is predicted that two such sentences will be judged as logically 
contradictory.  By contrast, the augmented classical view predicts that the two sentences will be 
logically compatible but pragmatically infelicitous when juxtaposed.  We investigated this issue using 
a method introduced by Katsos (2007, chapter 3; see Katsos 2008 for a review) with the aim of 
capturing the difference between logical contradiction and pragmatic infelicity for the case of scalar 
implicature.  
In this paradigm, participants are presented with statements and they are asked to give coherence 
judgements on a scale.  Under this methodology, we predicted that semantically self-contradictory 
statements would be judged as incoherent, while statements that were pragmatically self-contradictory 
                                                          
7
 Note that “at least 3” → “3” is valid if and only if the latter “3” is interpreted as existential rather than precise, 
in which case it is a tautology.  In our experiment, the consequent sentences in this case were “Anna wrote 3 
letters”, “There are 3 cities on the map”, and “Steve owns 3 suits”, all of which could plausibly be existential 
statement.  For items such as “Dave has 3 children”, we might expect lower rates of acceptance. 
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(i.e. in which an implicature is explicitly revised) would be judged more coherent, and statements 
with neither type of self-contradiction would be judged more coherent still.  The modal view of 
superlative quantifiers, holding that “at most n” semantically conveys the possibility of “exactly n”, 
predicts that a statement containing “at most n” and “exactly n-1” (with reference to the same entities) 
should pattern with the semantically self-contradictory statements.  Our proposal predicts that a 
statement containing “at most n” and “exactly n-1” should pattern either with the pragmatically self-
contradictory statements (if an implicature is generated) or with the non-self-contradictory statements 
(if it is not). 
9.1 Methodology 
20 participants were recruited, all members of the University of Cambridge, in the age range 20-36.  
14 were female.  Participants were presented with a pair of sentences linked by the word 
“specifically”, as in the following example, where Q denotes a quantifier and n and m denote 
numbers. 
(9) Jean has Q n houses.  Specifically, she has exactly m houses. 
They were asked to give a judgement on the coherence of the utterance, rating it on a Likert scale 
ranging from 5 (“coherent”) to -5 (“incoherent”). 
Two types of control items were included.  There were items using “In fact”, rather than 
“Specifically”, partially to disguise the goal of the experiment and partially to test whether 
participants‟ judgements would differ if the second sentence could be interpreted as a weakening of 
the speaker‟s commitment to the proposition originally expressed.  There were also items in which the 
quantifier and numeral in the first sentence were replaced with the quantifier “some”, and the numeral 
in the second sentence was replaced with “none of”, “half of” or “all of”8.  This tested the 
participants‟ response to violations of both semantic and pragmatic contradiction, as discussed above.   
In total, 78 items were used.  The value of n was varied over the range 3-5.  The results are 
summarised below. 
9.2 Results 
The following table shows the mean judgement of coherence, and the corresponding standard 
deviations, in each of the experimental conditions.  
 Quantifier 
in first 
sentence 
Quantifier 
in second 
sentence 
“Specifically” 
condition 
“In fact”  
condition 
Coherent? 
Mean SD Mean SD 
1 at most n exactly  
n-1 
1.58 2.57 1.87 2.53 ? 
2 at most n exactly n  1.90 2.31 1.25 2.60 ? 
3 at most n exactly n+1 -4.08 2.34 -4.05 2.10 No 
                                                          
8
 The sentences were chosen in such a way as to license the partitive usage. 
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 Quantifier 
in first 
sentence 
Quantifier 
in second 
sentence 
“Specifically” 
condition 
“In fact”  
condition 
Coherent? 
Mean SD Mean SD 
4 at least n exactly  
n-1 
-4.48 1.50 -4.27 1.88 No 
5 at least n exactly n 1.28 2.50 1.33 2.56 ? 
6 at least n exactly n+1 1.95 2.53 2.55 2.16 ? 
7 more than n exactly  
n-1 
-4.70 0.93 -4.28 1.92 No 
8 more than n exactly n+1 3.10 2.18 3.20 1.90 Yes 
9 fewer than n exactly  
n-1 
3.08 1.80 3.13 1.93 Yes 
10 fewer than n exactly n+1 -4.75 0.73 -4.23 2.05 No 
11 some none -4.60 1.14 -4.07 1.97 No 
12 some half 3.08 2.23 3.35 2.00 Yes 
13 some  all -1.08 3.13 0.22 3.10 ? 
 
The global mean across all conditions was -0.64, and the standard deviation 3.88. 
The semantically self-contradictory cases achieved low ratings in both conditions.  The semantically 
uncontroversially non-contradictory cases (8, 9 and 12) achieved high ratings.  The “in fact” condition 
was regarded as more coherent than the “specifically” condition for 12 out of the 13 cases (significant 
by the sign test, p < 0.01).  We will discuss the “specifically” condition for the following cases. 
Our first critical case was condition 1, “at most n…exactly n-1”.  Comparing condition 1 with 
condition 2, “at most n…exactly n”, a Student‟s t-test gives us t = 0.72, df = 118, p > 0.1.  Hence 
there is no significant difference between these conditions.  Comparing condition 1 with condition 3, 
the semantically false control “at most n…exactly n+1”, we obtain t = 12.6, df = 118, p < 0.01.  Thus 
condition 1 is highly significantly better than the relevant semantically false control. 
For the “at least” case, we compared condition 5 with condition 6, and obtained t = 1.46, df = 118, p > 
0.1.  Again, there is no significant difference between these cases.  Both are highly significantly (p < 
0.01) more acceptable than the semantically false control condition 4. 
Comparing the superlative with the comparative quantifiers, we find that the semantically true 
comparative conditions (8 and 9) yield significantly higher results than the corresponding superlative 
conditions (again, p < 0.01 for all comparisons). 
For the control “some” conditions, further pairwise comparisons reveal a significant preference for 
“some…half” over “some…all”, and “some…all” over “some…none” (p < 0.01 for each).  
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“Some…half” also outperforms conditions 1, 2, 5 and 6, which in turn outperform “some…all” (all p 
< 0.01). 
9.3 Discussion 
Broadly, the trends in both conditions are clear.  The statements in which pairs of sentences are 
semantically compatible, on a classical semantic view, are systematically judged to be coherent.  
Those in which the sentences are semantically contradictory are judged incoherent.  This trend plays 
out over both the “in fact” and “specifically” cases, although understandably participants appear to 
show slightly more leniency to self-contradictory utterances in the “in fact” case.  The results for the 
comparative cases license the assumption that this test is diagnostic for semantic coherence. 
For our purposes, the critical data are those in which the first sentence contains a superlative 
quantifier.  In these cases there is once again a clear-cut division between the cases which are 
semantically self-contradictory and those which are not.  Crucially, given a first sentence containing 
“at most n”, participants accept both a continuation “exactly n” and “exactly n-1”, with no statistically 
significant preference for one or the other.  
This fails to confirm the predictions arising from the semantically modal account of superlative 
quantifiers.  On this account, the superlative quantifier encodes the possibility of exact equality, a 
possibility which in our critical cases is then denied by the second sentence.  Nevertheless, the 
participants accept the relevant utterances as clearly coherent rather than incoherent.  Under the 
hypothesis of modality in the semantics, the lack of significant difference between conditions 1 and 2 
indicates that revising possibility to certainty is equally incoherent to revising possibility to 
impossibility, which appears implausible.  Notably, revising possibility to impossibility is judged 
significantly more coherent than revising “some” to “all”, which is a case of pragmatic self-
contradiction.  We therefore consider these data incompatible with the hypothesis that “at most” 
semantically encodes the possibility of equality. 
According to our competing proposal, the superlative quantifiers are give rise to modal interpretations 
due to pragmatic implicature.  Specifically, we are proposing that the “at most n” first sentence gives 
rise to an implicature that “exactly n” is possible.  Therefore, we would predict that the “at most n…n-
1” case should be more comparable to the “some...all” case, where such incoherence as exists arises 
from the second sentence contradicting an implicature of the first, than to the semantically 
contradictory cases.  This is indeed the case in our data: “some…all” is judged significantly more 
acceptable than “some…none” and the other contradictory cases, as does “at most n…n-1”.  Both are 
judged less acceptable than the non-contradictory cases with the comparative quantifiers (that do not 
trigger an implicature), as we predicted.   
Furthermore, our account also suggests that “at most n” should give rise to an implicature that “fewer 
than n” is possible, which in turn predicts that condition 2 will yield lower ratings than the 
comparative conditions, and similar ratings to those elicited in condition 1.  Our results suggest that 
this is indeed the case. 
Again we note that these forms are judged to be significantly more coherent than the “some…all” 
case, even though we are arguing that these are both self-contradictory at a pragmatic level.  However, 
there is a sizable gulf between these and the control semantically self-contradictory cases.  Put simply, 
the non-theory-critical cases present a clear pattern: the semantically self-contradictory cases are rated 
low, the pragmatically self-contradictory cases towards the middle of the scale, and the non-self-
contradictory cases are rated higher.  If we measure the superlative quantifier cases against this scale, 
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we see them clearly as pragmatically self-contradictory or fully non-self-contradictory.  Either way, 
this contradicts the semantically modal account.  Within our pragmatic account, we would suggest 
that the intermediate status of these results indicates implicature being generated, but less reliably or 
robustly than in the paradigm case of “some” (“but not all”). 
In summary, the coherence judgements elicited in this experiment point to a clear division between 
semantically self-contradictory and non-self-contradictory utterances, with pragmatically self-
contradictory utterances occupying the middle ground.  The case of “at most n…exactly n-1”, which 
should be semantically self-contradictory on the semantically modal account, appears to be either 
pragmatically self-contradictory or fully coherent, in accordance with our augmented classical 
account.  In fact, as predicted by our account, it patterns similarly to “at most n…exactly n”.  
Therefore we conclude that this experiment favours the augmented classical over the semantically 
modal account. 
10. Experiment 4 – Inference patterns in a conditional context 
The results of Experiment 3 raise the question of whether the inference “at most 2” to “at most 3”, 
rejected in Experiment 2, is available under the right conditions.  In Experiment 4, we aimed to elicit 
this inference, using a conditional context.   
Intuitively it seems that the superlative quantifiers behave like comparative quantifiers under the 
scope of conditionals, e.g. “If Berta had at least/most three drinks…”.  It was noted by Geurts and 
Nouwen (2007) that their semantically modal account is unsatisfactory with regard to these and 
certain other contexts.  In this experiment we investigated whether hearers interpret an utterance such 
as (10) as a commitment on the part of the speaker to the corresponding proposition (11). 
(10) “If Berta has had at most three drinks, she is fit to drive.  Berta has had at most two drinks.” 
(11) Berta is fit to drive. 
This conclusion appears to be licensed by the inference from “Berta has had at most two drinks” to 
“Berta has had at most three drinks”.  If the semantically modal account is correct, this inference 
should not be available, and the conclusion cannot be drawn.  If the classical account is correct, this 
inference is available, and the conclusion can be drawn unless it is blocked by an implicature.   
Similarly, the conclusion would be licensed by an inference from “If Berta has had at most three 
drinks, she is fit to drive” to “If Berta has had at most two drinks, she is fit to drive”.  If the 
semantically modal account is correct, this inference is not available either, as a modal interpretation 
either of “at most three” in the antecedent or “at most two” in the consequent would render it false.  If 
the classical account is correct, then again this inference is available and the conclusion can be drawn 
unless it is blocked by an implicature. 
10.1 Methodology 
Eight participants were recruited and were given the test as a questionnaire.  There were 14 items in 
all, three instances of the critical “at most 2”/“at most 3” case and one instance of each of the other 11 
conditions used in experiment 1.  Participants were presented with an utterance of the type given 
above, and then asked “Does the speaker believe that…?”  They were invited to respond “yes”, “no” 
or “don‟t know”.  “No” and “don‟t know” responses were both treated as negative with regard to the 
implication being investigated. 
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10.2 Results 
23/24 (96%) responses in the “at most 2”/ “at most 3” case were positive, agreeing that the inference 
was valid.  Responses in the other conditions also patterned with the mathematically valid outcomes. 
10.3 Discussion 
Under the conditions of this experiment, it does appear that the inference from “at most 2” to “at most 
3” (or the inference from “if…at most 3” to “if…at most 2”) goes through, contrary to the predictions 
we might expect to draw from the modal hypothesis.  This is, however, consistent with the classical 
account.   
This outcome is also consistent with our augmented classical account in which “at most” is considered 
disjunctive (“less than or equal to”) because the implicature arising from this is clearly different in a 
conditional environment to that arising in a declarative environment.  For instance, the utterance (12) 
does not give rise to the pragmatic interpretation (13). 
(12) “If Berta has had at most three drinks, she is fit to drive” 
(13) If it is possible that Berta has had at most three drinks and certain that she has had no more 
than three drinks, then she is fit to drive 
Why not?  Because (13) is a weakening of the original semantics of the utterances, namely (14). 
(14) If it is certain that Berta has had no more than three drinks, she is fit to drive   
Therefore deriving the implicature gives the hearer no additional information.  Even if the hearer 
derives the implicature, this will not supersede the existing semantic content, but stands alongside it.  
Therefore the pragmatic interpretation of the utterance remains (14), rather than the weaker (13).  
Rather than triggering a pragmatic enrichment, it seems intuitive to propose that the signal sent by 
using the “at most” formulation in this case is to draw attention to the upper bound.  (See Nouwen 
(2010) for a semantically-oriented account along similar lines.) 
To verify this observation, one can check the parallelism with the paradigmatic case of a possibility 
implicature arising from disjunction.  The declarative „There is beef or pork on the menu‟ appears to 
convey the implicature that either is possible.  By contrast, this implicature is not available in a 
conditional context, such as „If there is beef or pork on the menu, Max will be happy‟.  This is 
presumably because the pragmatic „enrichment‟ of possibility, when applied to the latter utterance, in 
fact makes it less informative, in that it imposes an extra condition (possibility of each conjunct) that 
would have to be satisfied before the conclusion could be drawn.  Hence, this implicature does not go 
through under the scope of a conditional.  
It might be argued that the materials used in this experiment are slightly awkward from a pragmatic 
standpoint.  A more naturalistic formulation would be along the lines of (15). 
(15) Anyone who has had at most three drinks is fit to drive.  Berta has had at most two drinks. 
However, in this case, it might conceivably be argued that the inferential process is not clear, as it 
requires an additional step.  The additional step might either be “Berta has had at most three drinks” 
or “Anyone who has had at most two drinks is fit to drive”.  We do not believe that anything hinges 
on this distinction, but we elected to use the methodology described above in order to allay any 
concerns arising from this uncertainty. 
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The result of this experiment is not entirely surprising in the light of Geurts and Nouwen‟s disclaimer 
about the legitimacy of the modal interpretation of superlative quantifiers.  The results can be 
explained by assuming that the superlative quantifier under the scope of the conditional has a purely 
classical meaning: it is not necessary to assume further that the superlative quantifier in the logical 
antecedent (“Berta has had at most two drinks”) also lacks modality.   
However, there does not appear to be any specific proposal to account for the absence of this type of 
semantic modal meaning within the conditional environment, apart from the classical view, which 
denies the existence of the modal meaning in toto.  It is not impossible to condition on modals, 
although it is rarely necessary and examples of it are consequently somewhat contrived (e.g. “If I 
think the project might succeed, I‟ll fund it for a trial period only”). 
For this reason, we consider that the outcome of this experiment lends support to an augmented 
classical account, in which superlative quantifiers are analysed as disjunctions, over the Geurts and 
Nouwen (2007) account in which these quantifiers possess modal semantics. 
These results also motivate us to consider whether the same kind of inference might be available in 
non-conditional contexts, for which Geurts and Nouwen do not identify a problem with their account.  
This is explored in the following task. 
11. Experiment 5 – Judgements of logical inference patterns in felicitous contexts 
Experiment 2 demonstrated the unavailability of certain classically correct inference patterns 
involving superlative quantifiers.  Under the semantically modal account, this arises for semantic 
reasons.  Under the augmented classical account, we have argued that this stems from the implicatures 
which arise from consequents containing superlative quantifiers. 
In Experiment 5, we attempt to differentiate these predictions by embedding the reasoning task in 
Experiment 2 within a theoretically more complex task in which the superlative quantifiers are 
licensed by the context.  For example, we ask participants to judge whether (16) implies (17). 
(16) Anne has three children but Brian has at most two children 
(17) Anne and Brian each have at most three children 
Assuming that this sentence is correctly analysed as predicating “having at most three children” of the 
two individuals “Anne” and “Brian”, we argue that acceptance of this implication requires acceptance 
that “at most two” implies “at most three” (in addition to acceptance that “three” implies “at most 
three”).  Recall that on the semantically modal account this is not available, so the inference should 
fail.  On the augmented classical account, it is available, so the inference should succeed unless it is 
blocked by implicature. 
11.1 Methodology 
20 participants were recruited, members of the University of Cambridge, in the age bracket 20-36.  14 
were female.  The methodology of Experiment 2 was replicated using 32 pairs of sentences of the 
type discussed above, using a range of numerical quantifiers.  The numerals and other aspects of the 
sentential content were varied between conditions. 
11.2 Results 
Acceptance rates for the test conditions (those for which multiple items were tested) were as follows. 
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 First sentence Second sentence Implication acceptance (%) 
1 n…at least n+1 at least n+1 0 
2 n…at least n+1 at least n  88 
3 n…at most n-1 at most n 68 
4 n…at most n-1 at most n-1 7 
5 n…fewer than n fewer than n 3 
6 n…fewer than n fewer than n+1 100 
7 n…more than n more than n 3 
8 n…more than n more than n-1 95 
 
In addition, results for the filler items were in accordance with semantic expectations.  Across all 
semantically uncontroversial conditions (that is, conditions which are not theory-critical for either 
approach under discussion)
9
, participants were correct on 488 out of 500 items (97.6%).  
Crucially, the acceptance rate for the theory-critical implication “n…at most n-1” → “at most n”  
items is significantly above 50% (41/60, p < 0.01 binomial); that is, neither floor nor ceiling. 
11.3 Discussion 
This finding contradicts the prediction of the semantically modal account of superlative quantifier 
meaning.  According to the modal view, as expounded in the interpretation of Experiment 1 of Geurts 
et al. (2010), the implication from “at most n-1” to “at most n” is unavailable.  By contrast, the results 
of this experiment indicate that this implication is available in certain declarative contexts, albeit less 
reliably than the corresponding implication with comparative quantifiers. 
Contrastingly, these data are compatible with our alternative proposal in which “at most” can be 
analysed as a disjunction and give rise to possible implicatures.  According to this proposal, “at most 
three” serves the function of drawing particular attention to the possibility that “exactly three” holds, 
and has the potential to give rise to an implicature to that effect.  However, in this situation, the 
implicature is not entirely inappropriate because the possibility of equality holds for one of the 
conjuncts, namely Anne (according to the implicature arising from (21)).  By contrast, on the 
semantically modal account, this possibility is part of the semantics of “at most three”, and should 
thus be required of both conjuncts. 
To put it another way, the majority of our participants are able to reason from “at most two” to “at 
most three” when the implicatures arising from “at most” can be accommodated without a 
contradiction arising.  By contrast, on the semantically modal account, this should not be possible, as 
the modality renders “at most three” inherently contradictory of “at most two”. 
                                                          
9
 This includes conditions 1 and 4-8 in the table above. 
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Is there a way to reconcile these data with the modal hypothesis?  We do not think so.  To do this, we 
would have to accept that the modal semantics of “at most three” also does not apply to the individual 
conjuncts of (17), as repeated below. 
(17) Anne and Brian each have at most three children. 
Instead, we would have to hold that the modal possibility applies only to some member of the set 
{Anne, Brian}, and is not binding upon the other.  In this example, that amounts to saying that (17) is 
true of a situation in which Anne might have three children, even if Brian cannot possibly have that 
many. 
While this analysis is theoretically viable, we find it unsatisfactory.  If the above manipulation is 
accessible to speakers, they should also attest the truth of such statements as (18a), or under the right 
circumstances even (18b) and (18c), etc. 
(18a) Anne and Brian each might have three children 
(18b) Anne and Brian each might be a young woman 
(18c) Anne and Brian each might be the only woman named Anne in the village. 
As these are intuitively false statements, we submit that “each” does not admit this analysis, and 
therefore that Experiment 4 gives evidence against the semantically modal account and in favour of 
the augmented classical account. 
12. General discussion 
Geurts et al. (2010) demonstrate empirical support for the hypothesis that the superlative quantifiers 
possess a modal component to their semantics, as proposed by Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  In this 
paper, we have robustly corroborated the finding that superlative quantifiers possess a modal 
component. We further proposed that the appropriate locus of the modality is in the pragmatics - and 
that the differences in the use of superlative quantifiers are due to this implicature as well as the 
psychological complexity of non-strict comparison relative to strict comparison. In order to document 
that non-strict comparison is more complex than strict comparison because it is disjunctive, we 
reported fresh experimental evidence on mathematical quantifier processing. We then argued that the 
classical account augmented by a disjunctive analysis for the non-strict comparison of the superlative 
case is equally compatible with the pre-existing empirical data as the semantically modal account.  In 
a further series of experiments, we have elicited data to suggest that our proposal is in fact more 
satisfactory than Geurts and Nouwen‟s semantically modal account of superlative quantification. 
Again we must mention that Geurts and Nouwen (2007) are aware of their theory‟s limitations in its 
present form, noting in particular the difficulties posed by the conditional context, e.g. “If Berta has 
had at most three drinks…”.  In Experiment 4, we provide a practical demonstration of this lacuna, 
and show how the non-modal superlative quantifier enters into logical relations.  However, in 
Experiments 3 and 5, we go further. In Experiment 3 we show that participants treat the „exactly n is 
possible‟ meaning of superlative quantifiers (with particular reference to “at most”, which gives rise 
to the clearest predictions) as a pragmatic, readily revisable inference rather than as part of the logical 
meaning of the expression. In Experiment 5 we show that the superlative quantifiers systematically 
appear to lack modal semantics, but that they give rise to implicatures which are similar but – in 
certain contexts – distinguishable from this modal semantic meaning.  
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We contend that the pattern of results observed across our set of experiments coheres with the notion 
that the semantic meaning of superlative quantifiers is fundamentally the classical meaning.  The 
“modal” meaning can instead be analysed as a possibility implicature arising from the use of a 
superlative quantifier with its disjunctive meaning. This means that there are indeed differences in the 
inferences that are licensed by superlative and comparative quantifiers, but they follow from the 
presence or absence of this implicature.  Moreover, our demonstration that the online performance 
preferences for comparative over superlative quantifiers are matched by an online performance 
preference for strict over non-strict comparison is exactly what one would expect if non-strict 
comparison is more complex (because it is disjunctive) than strict comparison in general.  
Under this analysis, we might argue that the communicative effect of “at most n” is to draw particular 
attention to the number n and the possibility of equality, neither of which are emphasised by the 
comparative alternative “fewer than n+1”.  In declarative contexts, the implicature that the superlative 
quantifier conveys is very similar to the semantic meaning proposed by Geurts and Nouwen (2007).  
In downward-entailing contexts, by contrast, the implicature does not arise for standard pragmatic 
reasons, whereas the semantic meaning proposed by Geurts and Nouwen cannot be explained away in 
such a principled fashion. 
Corpus data supports the notion that superlative quantifiers achieve this effect.  In the BNC, for 
instance, tokens of “at least 20” outnumber those of “more than 19” by 110 to 6.  However, tokens of 
“more than 20” outnumber “at least 21” by 357 to 23.  Similar patterns can be observed for round 
numbers flanked by non-round numbers, both in the BNC and other corpora.  This is a surprising 
observation within a modal semantic account of superlative quantifier meaning, as it appears to 
suggest that the use of superlative quantifiers is sometimes motivated by something other than the 
wish to express modality.  Our augmented classical account is compatible with this notion, given that 
the use of a round number licenses the use of a superlative quantifier, as the value being called 
attention to is a salient one.  By contrast, imputing modality to superlative quantifiers curtails the 
expressive power of the system, by constraining our choice of number unless we are indifferent to 
whether or not we use a modal expression.  
This would explain why, in our Experiment 5, the logical implication from “at most 2” to “at most 3” 
is accepted, while it was rejected in Experiment 2; in Experiment 5, “at most” is used (in the 
consequent) in conjunction with a salient number as determined by the preceding utterance.  Under 
these circumstances the superlative quantifier in the consequent is licensed and no implicature arises.  
In the absence of this implicature, the superlative quantifier possesses purely classical meaning and 
the logically correct inference is drawn. 
This proposal has implications for the analysis of other expressions.  For example, consider the 
distribution of “not more than” and “not fewer/less than”.  It could be argued that these are modal, but 
it seems more plausible, compositionally speaking, to count them as classically-semantic comparative 
quantifiers.  The relevant semantic difference between these and their non-negated counterparts is 
that, while “more/fewer than n” excludes the possibility of n, “not more/fewer than n” admits this 
possibility.  It is simply this difference that appears to underlie the following differences in 
distribution. 
(19a) *Fewer than three people have that authority, namely the Queen and the Prime Minister. 
(19b) 
?
Not fewer than two people have that authority, namely the Queen and the Prime Minister. 
(19c) Not more than two people have that authority, namely the Queen and the Prime Minister. 
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(20a) *Wilma danced with fewer/less than every second man who asked her. 
(20b) 
?
Wilma danced with not less than every second man who asked her. 
(20c) 
?
Wilma danced with not more than every second man who asked her. 
In (19b) and (19c), explicit reference to “two people” licenses the “namely” continuation; in (20b) and 
(20c), the possibility of equality seems to license the use of the comparative quantifier in a context in 
which it is otherwise understood to be forbidden.  In both cases, the difference resides in classical 
semantic properties of the quantifiers. 
More could be said about this, and indeed its relation to the “no more/fewer than” construction 
discussed by Nouwen (2008), but like Geurts and Nouwen (2007: 37f), we take the view that the 
definitive answer to the question of superlative and comparative quantifier distribution will arise from 
a more general theory of comparison. 
 
 26 
References 
Barwise, J. and Cooper, R. (1981).  Generalized quantifiers and natural language.  Linguistics and 
Philosophy, 4: 159-219.  
The British National Corpus, version 3 (2007). Distributed by Oxford University Computing Services 
on behalf of the BNC Consortium.  Accessed via http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/  
Büring, D. (2007).  The least „at least‟ can do.  In C. B. Chang and H. J. Haynie (eds.), Proceedings of 
WCCFL 26.  Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.  114-120.     
Geurts, B. (2006).  Take “five”: the meaning and use of a number word.  In Vogeleer, S. and 
Tasmowski, L. (eds.), Non-definiteness and plurality.  John Benjamins, Amsterdam.  311-329. 
Geurts, B. and Nouwen, R. (2007).  At least et al.: the semantics of scalar modifiers.  Language, 
83:533-559. 
Geurts, B., Katsos, N., Cummins, C., Moons, J. and Noordman, L. (2010).  Scalar quantifiers: logic, 
acquisition and processing.  Language and Cognitive Processes, 25(1): 130-48. 
Grice, H. P. (1975).  Logic and Conversation.  In P. Cole and J.L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and 
Semantics, Vol. 3. New York: Academic Press.  41-58. 
Horn, L. (1972).  On the semantic properties of logical operators in English.  UCLA dissertation, 
distributed by Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1976. 
Katsos, N. (2007). Experimental investigations on the effects of structure and context on the 
generation of scalar implicatures. PhD thesis, University of Cambridge. 
Katsos, N. (2008). The semantics/pragmatics interface from an experimental perspective: the case of 
scalar implicature, Synthese, 165: 358-401 
Krifka, M. (1999).  At least some determiners aren‟t determiners.  In K. Turner (ed.), The 
Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View, Current Research in the 
Semantics/Pragmatics Interface Vol. 1.  Oxford: Elsevier.  257-92. 
Musolino, J. (2004).  The semantics and acquisition of number words: integrating linguistic and 
developmental perspectives.  Cognition, 93:1-41. 
Nouwen, R. (2008).  Upperbounded no more: the exhaustive interpretation of non-strict comparison.  
Natural Language Semantics, 16(4): 271-95. 
Nouwen, R. (2010).  Two kinds of modified numerals.  Semantics and Pragmatics, 3(3): 1-41. 
R Development Core Team (2008).  R: A language and environment for statistical computing.  R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.  ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL http://www.R-
project.org. 
